Fake airdrops use supposed "claim eligibility" to persuade users to connect their wallets and approve token spending. Connecting usually reveals only a wallet address; the permissions granted by subsequent signatures determine whether funds are at risk.

Connecting a wallet usually exposes only its address to a website and does not automatically transfer assets. A standard login signature can prove control of an address, but if its contents, domain, or purpose are unclear, it may be replayed or incorporated into an authorization flow.
Approve allows a Spender to call a token contract and transfer assets up to the approved amount. Signature-based authorizations such as Permit can be signed off-chain and later submitted on-chain by someone else. The fact that a user does not pay Gas at the time does not mean the signature cannot affect their funds.
A direct transaction may also invoke batch transfers, assign an operator, or upgrade a proxy. A wallet prompt should clearly show the contract, method, asset, amount, and recipient. Blind-signing a prompt that displays only hexadecimal data carries greater risk.
Common entry points include tokens or NFTs that suddenly appear in a wallet, social media replies, search ads, impersonated project accounts, QR codes, and "eligibility checker" websites. Anyone can copy a token name or logo and create an on-chain asset.
Verify the legitimate entry point by cross-checking several official project channels, then confirm the domain and contract. Do not follow claim links in the description of a spam token in your wallet, and do not interact with its contract merely to remove the unwanted asset.

First, use a trusted block explorer or approval-checking tool to review current Spenders, tokens, and allowances, then revoke any permissions you no longer need. Revocation is itself an on-chain transaction and requires Gas on the correct network.
If assets continue to leave the wallet, determine whether the seed phrase, private key, or device has been compromised. When a key has leaked, revoking an approval only changes contract permissions temporarily; the attacker can still sign transactions directly, so move the remaining assets to a completely new wallet.
Preserve the malicious domain, contract, Spender, signature contents, and transaction hash. Do not reconnect to the same suspicious website to "revoke" access, and never provide screenshots or a seed phrase to unsolicited support agents.
For ongoing permission management, read Managing Wallet Approvals. To recognize support impersonation, see Fake Customer Support and Technical Support. For a broader overview, return to the Complete Guide to Cryptocurrency Scams.
Not necessarily. A signature may authorize a third party to submit a transaction later. Read the structured message and verify who receives the authorization.
No. Revocation only prevents future use of that approval; it cannot reverse a confirmed transfer.
Usually, you do not need to interact with it. You can hide spam assets in the wallet interface, while calling an unknown contract may introduce additional risk.
No. A limited allowance reduces the impact of a single approval, but assets within that allowance may still be transferred, and a malicious transaction may request other permissions.